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Each of the three levels of government in the Netherlands, national, provincial and
municipal, has an official who is the first to be addressed: the Secretary-General, the
Provincial Registrar and the Municipal Clerk respectively.
The positions of Provincial Registrar and Municipal Clerk in their systems are
stipulated by provincial and municipal law.
Howevet the position ofthe Secretary-General in the national government is not
stipulated by law, but is solely based upon the Royal Decree of 18 Octobea 1988.
The explication accompanying the Royal Decree specifies that the Secretary-
General is an advisor to the Minister and is responsible for the coordination and
integration of Ministry policy. The Cabinet had no need for an extensive directive
describing the job of Secretary-General, and in order not ro pre-empr future
developments, confined itselfto the stipulation of one principle. In an effort to meet
with the wide variety of practical needs on the part of the various Ministries, the
Cabinet emphasized that ample leeway should be allowed for differentiation.
Not only is the juridical position of the Secretary-General unspecified, so is the
extent of his or her competence in the field of finances and legal status affairs. Powers
are emphatically and by law directly granted to the head of the Central Department
of Financial and Economic A-fÊairs, and in legal and personnel affairs the Crown or
the Minister is often the competent authoriry whereas ifany mandate at all is granted,
authoriry is generally granted to the head of the Central Department of Personnel
Affairs or to the Deputy Secretaries.
The second Lubbers Cabinet viewed the responsibility in the field of managemenr
as clearly a part of the job of the Secretary-General, though it was a responsibility
that was part and parcel of the duties regarding policy development. The Cabinet
did not feel it was right to view management as the main dury of the Secretary-
General. Moreover, the Secretary-General is an advisor to the Minister, and is
responsible for policy coordination and integration within the Department.
In departmental practice, it has been evident on various occasions that central
supervision is required for purposes of:
- a responsible and accountable administration and managemenr;
- large-scale operations such as personnel or budget reductions, deregulation, task
transfers, checks on expenses;
- a clear and comprehensive organizational strucrure of the department;
- the prevention of sectarian divisions;
- the prevention of policy inconsistencies.
262 Summary
The question now arises as regards the extent to which rhese are the primary d,uties
of the Secretary-General. Can he or she be called upon to fulfill these duiies? Or
does the answer to this question dissolve in the diffuse intermediate region berween
the responsibiliry of the Minister and that of officialdom, so rhar -. 
"i. 
alternately
confronted with the imminent departure of either a Minister or a Secretary-G.ner"Í?
It will be clear from the historical outline that the quesrion of what a Secretary-
General's job essentially amounts to, and particularly what his or her relation is to
the political top and to the Deputy Secretaries, is one that has been posed throushout
history.
We nonetheless see a traditional, more or less constrained adherence to the uniry
of policy and control. On the other hand, in conremporary thinking on the
departmental organization which, due to the increasing number of tasks and powers
of the central government, exhibits a tendenry toward rigidiry the idea has developed
of implementing separate recognizable unirs strucrured on the basis of an adequate
div is ion of  labour.
In addition, there is the departmental organization which, structured according
to the traditional line / staff model, and despite traverse connecrions and short
circuits, whether formal or informal, still has the hierarchic pyramid as its model. It
is an organization in which policy aspecrs initially prevailed but which, due in part
to a number of 'affairs,' is now increasingly called upon to devote attention to
management. In practice, this means a reinforced tendenry to allow sub-departmenrs
to work independently by not only making them responsible for policy.ào--.n-
dations and policy execution, but increasingly for management as well. This leads
to a clear regulation of responsibilities.
Vorking from the principle of Ministerial responsibility and consequendy from
the primate of politics in the departmental organization, which m€ans Parliament
can call the Minister ro accounr for everything done at his or her departmenr, this
principle leads to a central supervision of the official apparatus.
This central supervision has a political as well as an official component, as is
personified in the Minister and the Secretary-General alike.
This is why in the field between the world of politics and the official apparatus,
the position of the Secretary-General is recurrently a central point in the discussion
which, in an era of greatly altering views on rhe government and its tasks, is bound
to cont inue for  qui te some r ime to come.
In this dissertation, the central question is whether and to what extenr the office
of Secretary-General in its present-day configuration, in accordance with the expli-
cation accompanying the Royal Decree of October 1988, is in keeping with devel-
opments in the fields of administration and management on the part of and within
the national governmenr, and what role the Secretary-General could and should
fulfill for the department. In other words, what contribution can he or she make
toward the required central supervision of the official apparatus? What is the added
va,lue of the function of Secretary-General ro a national department?
It should be noted in this connection that the ÍLnction of Secretary-General is
still as relevant as ever to a national department, but that its position within the
official apparatus is not undisputed and can give rise ro a cerrain exrenr of tension.
The nature of the function is, however, such that from its perspective a contribution
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can be made toward settling whatever friction there might be within a department.
In particular, the relations of Secretaries-General to members of the Cabinet and to
the official apparatus including the Depury Secretaries are of importance.
The history of the office of Secretary-General illustrates that again and again, the
proposition was postulated that within each department, there ought to be one
central official who coordinates affairs and who all the other officials are subordinate
to, namely the Secretary-General.
The coordinating role of the Secretary-General can be implemented in various
manners. The following capacities might be mentioned in this respect:
- advisor and assistant to the Minister;
- manager and supervisor ofthe department with a central role in its administration;
- policy coordinator;
- intermediary between the political arena and the department;
- person in charge of stipulating the Ministerial responsibilities;
- depury who replaces the Minister in his absence.
The historical survey also makes it clear that the Secretary-General was not, however,
granted this central position intended for him. First it were the Deputy Secretaries
who undermined his central position, later the commissioners and administrators
and later still, once again the Depury Secretaries. The remedy was always the same:
put all the officials back under the auspices of the Secretary-General, liquidate
independent sub-departm€nt branches or make a sub-department branch truly
independent under the leadership of its own Secretary-General. In practice, however,
nothing ever came of this line of thought.
It is striking that from the various perspectives, policy and management elements
are both called for. The Secretary-General not only has to act as a knowledgeable
policy advisor, he also has to have marked managerial qualities.
In our governmental system, no political formula has ever been advocated
pertaining to cooperation between the Minister and the Secretary-General. No one
has, for example, ever recommended the American / Belgian system, whereby the
people at the head of the official apparatus come and go with the Minister.
In con.iunction with the Committee on the Main Structure of the National Depart-
menrs, also known as the Vonhoff Committee, it can be concluded that the effective
functioning of the entire departmental organization, including the members of the
Cabinet, is dependenr upon the proper fulfillment of the entire packet of duties of
the Secretary-General, and that the proper fulfillment of the entire packet by one
and the same person is probably unfeasible and certainly undesirable.
From the questionnaire survey conducted in i986-r988, and even at the time of
the emergence of the ry66 Royal Decree in which the position of the Secretary-
General was sripulated for the first time since r8zl, it was evident that the function
of Secretary-General could be fulfilled in totally different manners by different
individuals. This depends in part on their relations to members of the Cabinet and
the Depury Secretaries, and in part on their personal affinities and preferences. The
fact that the Secretary-General is the highest official might be stipulated in the
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officialdom hierarchy, but this does not necessarily mean that the Secretary-General
is indeed the most influential official at the deoartment.
The demands of running a compl.* 
"r,á 
dynamic sociery have led ro rhe
development of a detailed regulatory structure including monitoring systems and
sanctions. And yet numerous societal developments and the situations that ensued
from them have proved to be unforeseeable, unmonitorable or unsanctionable. By
way ofsimplif ing the regulatory structure and improving the quality of the legislative
process, steps could be taken to remedy this situation. It would seem, however, that
the legislativ€ system has reached the borders ofits effectiveness.
The refinement of the regulatory structure has led to an abundance of govern-
mental notices and pronouncements and instructions as products oflegal ordinances.
This abundance has led in turn to the unacceptable complexity of this system of
rules and regulations. The government should become actively engaged in eliminat-
ing tasks that are no longer relevant. In addition, the government should adopt a
more critical attitude toward accepting new tasks. The government should confine
itself to steering sociery in a more global fashion.
An essential element of discontinuiry is at the foundation of the structure of our
nationt political system. From time to time, the factual political situation can be a
factor that causes discontinuity. However, the principle of continuity is inherent to
the functioning of a government. It is from this principle that a government largely
derives its legitimacy. It is thus desirable that the field of tension that is implicitly
present should be neutralized by assigning public management the task of seeing to
the continuiry of the public organizational system.
For this purpose, adequate powers are required in order to structure the official
apparatus as the management sees fit, particularly on behalf of the policy implemen-
tation stipulated by the political arena.
Strategic management enables the safeguarding of the organization's continuity
to take shape. This strategic management gives form and contents to the organiza-
tion's activities. Thus a framework can be created whereby, on the basis of common
points of departure, political administration and public management work side by
side to implement the policies stipulated by the political powers. In this connection,
the concern for the execution of these oolicies should be emohaticallv claimed bv
rhe publ ic  management system.
The bureaucratic organization described by tVeber is of great significance to the
structure of public organizations. The design of the bureaucratic model is, however,
of a static and centralistic nature and assumes a large extent of predictabiliry as regards
the task of the central government. However, rapidly changing social circumstances
require a more flexible organization. The growth and expansion of governmental
duties and modern-day dynamics have confronted the 
'l7eberian governmental
organization with certain problems. In order to cope with present-day dynamics,
the government is forced to drastically alter its existing organizational structure,
which necessitates new steering principles for the official apparatus. A larger extent
of freedom to be bestowed upon the various organizational components and the
far-reaching decentralization of the official apparatus can present a solution in this
connection. In addition to the classical demands, the modern requirements of
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efficiency, effectiveness and simplicity should be the points ofdeparture in the process
of transforming the governmental organization into a far more dynamic one, thus
resulting in an organically sffuctured governmental organization. Recognizable units
should be formed for the execution of recognizable elements of the governmental
duties.
The political primate implies that the Minister can be called to account by
Parliament for everything that is done or not done at the department, but that he
or she can only be held responsible in so far as he or she was directly or indirectly
involved or should have been in the opinion of Parliament. The Ministert respon-
sibiliry for everlthing officials do or fail to do is a judicial realiry although in reality
it is fictitious.
It is above all else the responsibiliry of the Secretary-General to do whatever is
possible to effectuate this Ministerial responsibiliry at and by the department. This
is of particular importance as regards the relevant information flow to the members
of the Cabinet. It also means an expansion of the democratic insight into the official
apparatus, and the simplification of the structure of the departmental organization.
The actual possibilities for the Minister to control departmental actors and
processes are limited. By delegating duties in the field of detailed decision-making
and policy implementation to public management officials, assuming the loyalry of
these officials, one can create for oneself the room required for the main lines of
decision-making and policy implementation.
Thus in fact part of the decision-making power shifts from the politically
responsible Minister to the administration, and there is consequently, to a certain
extent, a reduction of the direct influence of the Minister. Forms of official
responsibiliry develop, certainly internally in the organization, by way of self-admin-
istration and contract management. There is an accountabiliry obligation via
reporting back, followed by whatever adjustments might be called for.
The classical hierarchy does not necessarily conflict with these contemporary
developments as regards selÊadministration and contract manag€ment. The political
arena is solely exempted from having to deal with management questions, but
without losing sight of the main points. After all, the primate of politics and the
official final responsibility of the Secretary-General mean that'selÊadministration'
can not be autonomy, and that in the case of contract management, a'contract' can
still be declared null and void by the political and official 'powers that be.'
The obligation on the part of public officials to remain politically accountable to
Parliament is not in keeping with our constitutional system. The public official is
not democratically warranted to be politically accountable. There are nonetheless
developments which, with the confirmation of the primate of politics, propagate an
accountability of public officials that is clear externally as well. One conceivable
option might involve the presentation of factual information to parliamentary
committees, but there is also the option of having public officials give the parliamen-
tary committees insight into the departmental execution of duties.
Also in view of the central steering of the departmental organization, this
accountability on the part of public officials is not a positive development. It might
be more advisable to increase the responsibiliw of the Secretary-Ceneral for the
2ó5
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effective supervision and management of the department by also appointing him or
her 'accounting officer' vis-à-vis the Minister and Parliament, as is stipulated in the
British system.
The special relation between the Minister and the Secretary-General has also been
examined in detail. It was observed that this relation is one that is based - or at any
rate should be based - upon mutual trust. In his or her relation to the Minister, the
Secretary-General is:
- head advisor in a position to express a second opinion in the various sub-fields
covered by the department;
- responsible for the essendal flow of information provided by the official apparatus;
- in charge of policy coordination and integration within the department;
- the person who safeguards the interests of the official apparatus.
It is the task of the Secretary-General to oversee the various consequences of the aims
strived for within the department, and to safeguard the policy consistency as regards
their various facets. This automatically puts him or her in a coordinating and
integrating role, whereby it has been noted that this role can best be played in
consultation with the Depury Secretaries. This team element develops in the official
staffs already in existence at most of the departments, in which policy and manage-
ment questions are addressed and strategic and coordination problems are solved.
Thus the potential is guaranteed for the central steering of a large-scale, widelyvaried
and complex organization. The top of the organization is then no longer solely of a
hierarchic and pyramidal design, but is organized more as a management team after
the model of a board of directors in the private sectors. The Secretary-General then
functions as the chairman of this management team.
By way of a shift in the role of the Secretary-General from superintendent of
finances and personnel or legal matters in the classical model of checks and balances
to coordinator and chairman of the management team, the role and attitude of the
central staffmembers should be altered as well and become more focused upon the
contro l  Funct ion and upon macro-steer ing.
Differences will emerge and continue to exist in the ways each of the above-men-
tioned functions are executed in actual practice. One of the features of the top
functions discussed here is the amount of leeway that exists or can apparently be
either given or taken by each organization, and even by each person, to attribute
specific contents to the functions. The various facets do not remain confined to the
function as such, but have a far greater radiation to the management of the
organization in its totaliry and to relations within the organization, including those
pertaining to contact between the official apparatus and the political arena.
A comparison of the fi-rnctions of Provincial Registrar and Municipal Clerk with
that of Secretary-General demonstrates that in the task descriptions of the first two
functions, leadership over the official apparatus is not of central importance. In the
execution of the function of Secretary-General, historical conditions and personal
factors and circumstances have caused differences between the various departments
to come into being:
- one Secretary-General is clearly at the top and leaves his mark on the official
leadership framework, whereas another Secretary sees the creation of conditions
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and circumstances under which tasks can be implemented far more as his or her
role and takes responsibiliry for coordination;
- one Secretary-General clearly focuses attention on poliry matters and is thus
sometimes a kind of 'Super Deputy Secretary,' whereas another Secretary-General
concentrates almost totally on the management and day-to-day supervision of
the department.
It is important to consider that within the realm of the Provincial Registrar and the
Municipal Clerk, integral management occurs, whereas the realm of the Secretary-
General remains 'confined' to one and only one sector of national government. At
the municipal and provincial levels, a coordination and integration faciliry is
cons€quently available for all the various facets of the official apparatus, but there is
no comparable faciliry at the national level.
In view of the importance rightly attributed to promoting the efficacious attune-
ment of the various sectors of national policy, one might wonder whether and to
what extent the Secretaries-General, either individually or collectively on the Board
of Secretaries-General, can fulfill a role in this connection.
Until recently, the Board of Secretaries-General hardly played any role of signi-
ficance in the national government. In the period prior to the Second \íorld \íar,
attention was devoted to routine matters of local importance. In the reconstruction
period following the Second \7orld \Var, the social component came to the fore at
the sessions where the Secretaries-General gathered to meet. The absence of a
component of wider import at meetings held during this period can be explained as
a reaction to the course of affairs in the r94o-r945 period.
Taking into consideration the consequential alterations that have occurred in the
duties of the national government and the increasingly important aspects of man-
agement and control, it is only logical that the coordinating consultations among
the Secretaries-General, on behalf of their coordination with each other and the
implementation of their respective duties, should have acquired a more structural
character. In this manner, the preparation of policies to be discussed at the session
of the Council ofMinisters can take place in a more efficient manner. Developments
pertaining to the functioning of the national government, as they are now foreseen,
also make the further institutionalization of the consultations of the Secretaries-
General a matter of necessity.
Before standpoints are stipulated as regards management affairs within the
national government, the Council of Ministers might also request prior recommen-
dations or enter into consultations with the ioint Secretaries-General. The initiative
taken by the Secretaries-General, as has been noted above, would tend to indicate a
development in this direction. It should be noted here that in contrast to the
municipaliry and the province, where the Municipal Clerk and the Provincial
Registrar attend the sessions of the Mayor and Aldermen Board and the Provincial
Executive respectively, the Secretary-General is not in a position to propose the
discussion of managemenr aspecrs at meettngs of the Council of Minisrcrs-
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Netherlands it is not the Secretary-General, but the head of the central division of
financial affairs at a department, who bears responsibiliry for the financial manage-
menr in accordancewith Section r8 ofthe GovernmentAccountsAct. Thedesirabiliry
of appointing the Secretary-General of a department as Accounting Officer is clearly
formulated in the description of the system adhered to in the United Kingdom. The
idea is advanced that it would be wise to alter Section 18 of the GovernmentAccounts
Act in such a way as to make the Secretary-General the functionary holding the
prime responsibiliry for the execution of this Act.
The status of officials employed by the national government can also be derived
from the research focused upon the United Kingdom. One specific facet of the
British Civil Service is that officials are appointed by this Civil Service and not by a
department. Officials are in the service of the Crown or the Cabinet, rather than in
the service of a specific Minister. This kind of configuration leads to a considerable
increase in the mobiliry of the official within the national government system. It is
desirable that a step like the one taken by the Dutch Minister of Home Affairs - to
employ national officials in the general service of the national government - be
elaborated upon and not remain confined to higher personnel levels.
In November r99r, the Secretaries-General once again sent a letter to the Prime
Minister, the Minister of Finances and the Minister of Home Affairs drawing
attention to the progress of the Great Efficiency Operation. The developments set
in motion by the Dutch Minister of Home Affairs as regards a poliry focused upon
appointments in general national service for higher ranks of officials, in conjunction
with the formation by the Ministry of Home Affairs of a data bank on top managers
employed by the national government, would seem to have marked a first step toward
changes in the position of national officials in theyears to come. In this sense, the
concern on the part of the Secretaries-General in this connection is quite warranted
nowadays. It should consequently be recommended that a structured platform for
the initiation and guidance of the outlined developments be created in the spirit of
the Civil Service Committee in the United Kingdom and the Board of Secretaries-
General in Belgium. The further elaboration of a sffucture that, in the course of
time, could lead to a Board of Secretaries-General in whatever form would also be
desirable.
It is clear from the description ofthe organizational structure, particularly regarding
the interface berween the political leadership and the bureaucracy top as is specified
for a number of nations, that there is a relation berween the political contents
attributed to official functions and the relatively short term during which they are
occupied by one and the same official on the one hand, and the functionary with
no political affiliation and the continuity of the fulfillment of the firnction on the
otnef.
A central position is occupied by a description of the structure of the 'constructive
friction that ought to exist in the collaboration between the politician bearing the
prime responsibiliry the Minister, and his top official.
The description of the situation in this respect in the United Kingdom illustrates
a striving 'to safeguard the political neutraliry of the higher Civil Service.'
In France, rhere are two arguments to justify the Cabinet Ministériel: firstly the
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necessity for a political institute to counterbalance the official appararus, and secondly
the unstable nature of French politics, obligating Ministers in office to counterbal-
ance the bureaucrary based upon continuity.
In Belgium, the following has been said about the functioning of the head of the
Cabinet Ministériel: 'LEsprit qui anime le Chef du Cabinet est nécessairement fausse
par la nature de la mission qui est dévolué.'As regards the Secretary-General, it has
been commented that'one can not ask him not to belong ro any party at all. His
opinions should nonetheless solely influence his private life, in the execution of his
duties he should be non-political.'
The description of the course of affairs in the United States once again emphasizes
that the mode in which top functions in the bureaucracy are fulfilled is largely
determined by the political affiliation and personal preferences of the elected
President and the Secretaries appointed by him.
The differences depicted above, whereby in the United Kingdom the principle
of continuiry is apparently preferred and in France, the United States and Belgium
the political tints of the top functions are attributed with great significance, do not
seem to play a role of any import in the Netherlands. There is a striking similarity
to the course of affairs in the United Kingdom. If, in the relation between the world
of politics and the bureaucracy, top officials bear responsibiliry for the necessary
continuitF in the public administration, a likeness strived for upon the basis of this
notion is undesirable, and no further steps should be taken toward incorporating
political preferences into the process of appointing top officials. Consequently, on
a long-term basis as well, a politically value-free discussion will remain feasible about
the qualiry of the 'constructive friction between the world of politics and the
bureaucrary, and will be aimed toward attaining a qualitatively high and professional
DUreaucracy.
It would be wise to draw a distinction in the personnel scaling of the Depury
Secretary and the Secretary-General at the same department. In this way, the position
of the Secretary-General as the highest official at a de partment would be substantively
and formally confirmed.
In addition, to promote the mobiliry ofthe rop management, it would be desirable
to introduce differentiation into the personnel scaling of Secretaries-General within
the salary scales that apply to politicians and top official functionaries. The differen-
tiation can be executed on the basis of a number of aspects, such as the number of
employees in each department, the number of politically sensitive topics being
addressed within each department, and fie size of the budget of each department.
In order to create viable opportunities for the recruitment of candidates from the
world of trade and industry for top functions in the national apparatus, it is necessary
to develop a remuneration system incorporating greater flexibiliry.
In view of the increasing significance of the obligation for public officials to be
accountable to the politically responsible Minister or to Parliament, it is desirable
to design a more structured form for the dismissal policy regarding Secretaries-
General. The introduction of a temporary appointment for a period of six years
would seem to be a good way to formally terminate the employment situation if and
when there is reason to do so on the grounds of policy-related considerarions.
Proposals have been made for the further development of the decentralization
2óg
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process that has been put in motion as regards the role ofemployer within the national
apparatus. A situation can thus come into being in which formal and substantive
aspects can differ from one employer or department to the next. This can mean the
Secretary-General will come to fulfill a far more comprehensive role than is the case
today in determining the labour conditions at a department. This means he or she
is simultaneously a party with a direct interest in the packet of labour conditions
and the parry who bears the prime responsibiliry for the implementation of this
policy within the department. The conflict of interests implicitly created by this
situation can be prevented by instituting at the political level, in other words on the
basis of consultations berween the Minister of Home Affairs and the individual
Ministers, a regime designed to reinforce the legal position ofthe Secretaries-General.
The effectuation of a regime of this kind would have to be carried out for each
separate department by the Minister in charge there.
\Within the departmentally organized public administration at the level of the
national government, there has always been one central official whose task it has
been to coordinate the various governmental duties to be executed by a department.
This official has solely been able to function on the basis of a relation of trust with
the political superior. If a Minister is not capable of having the required faith and
trust in the official who bears the prime responsibility at the department, then there
is no way the departmental organization can function properly. In the Netherlands,
it is not the Secretary-General in office who takes the political consequences for the
arrival or departure of a Minister. In his or her conduct, the Secretary-General should
be able to act in accordance with the political primate that serves as point ofdeparture
in the Dutch governmental system.
The execution of the will of the political administration occupies a central
position. This execution can, however, solely be effectuated by the official apparatus
if and when, on the grounds of natural considerations, the political administration
is willing to delegate it to the official apparatus.
Ever since the mid-eighties, there has been renewed interest in the collaboration
benveen the public and the private sector in order to implement societal changes.
In essence, collaboration of this kind is not new. It constitutes a reaction to the
societal polarization that emerged at the end of the sixties and was characteristic of
the seventies, when governmental agencies and the world of trade and industry made
every effort to avoid any contact with each other. The cultural climate of the eighties,
the spirit in which governmental agencies go about performing their tasks, was
fundamentally different from the circumstances th€ gov€rnment had to operate
under until about 1985. Far more than before, Dutch society was now focused on
service aspects. Government policy was now aimed toward providing facilities to
supplement the initiatives taken by the private sector. In order to be able to fulfill
this new governmental dury in an adequate manner, the government has had no
choice but to institute comprehensive alterations in its existing organizational
structure. This process has also necessitated new guidelines for control. Possible
solutions have involved allowing for a larger extent ofdifferentiation in governmental
organizations and a larger extent offreedom in the various organizational units within
the governmental apparatus. Recognizable units for the execution of recognizable
duties have been called for. It has been necessary in this connection to introduce
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considerable budget cuts as regards governmental expenditures. This has made it
necessary for the governmental management apparatus to focus in part upon
achieving optimal organizational efficiency and a restriction of expenditures. In view
of the increasing dynamics of sociery the government will have to be more alert than
ever before when addressing tasks once again, and wherever necessary will have to
consider eliminating duties that are no longer relevant.
The changes described above in the mode of thinking as regards the role of
government have had direct consequences affecting the task of the Secretary-General.
A dynamic society requires a dynamic government. A sociery-oriented approach to
the role of government provides the building blocks for the structure of the
government. As a result of the altered economic conditions and changing views on
the extent ofdetail to which society ought to be steered, the governmentwill continue
to withdraw. In conjunction with this, there is similarly a need for less detailed
legislation. Thus the government sees it as its duty to continue fulfilling its tasks
with a limited number of regulation-oriented measures, with a smaller and less
expensive organization, and confronted with a sociery increasingly subject to change.
The necessity for greater austerity in stipulating political ambitions and the required
differentiation in the governmental organization have led it to an increasing use of
achievement-oriented agreements between the world of politics and the official
organizations as well as to the need for continuing decentralization. This leads to a
further diversification of the governmental organizations. Their greater inde-
pendence make s it ne cessary to develop control systems. The unambiguous structures
which governmental functioning was based on up until the eighties have made it
possible to supervise large organizational units such as departments by way of
standard procedures and techniques. For each of the various departments, the
diversification referred to above requires a difltrent attitude on the part of the
department management or a different type of manager. The shift in the role of the
Secretary-General from being a superintendent of finance and personnel or legal
matters in the classical model of checla and balances to being a coordinator and
chairman of a top management team supervising the officials employed by a
department with its own identity and predilections requires a new attitude on the
part of the Secretary-General, an attirude focused on macro-steering and on the
coordination and integration of policy and management. In addition, both in the
interdepartmental circuit andvis-à-vis the private sector, the importance will increase
of the external role of the Secretary-General. In view of the growing significance of
positive attunement among the various sectors of national policy, not only will the
external functioning of the Secretary-General become more important, itwill exceed
the task packet of the department under his or her custody. Consultations for
purposes of coordination and management, as will increasingly have to take place
among the various Secretaries-General, will also have to be structured into what will
eventually be formalized as a Board of Secretaries-General. In this manner, the
Secretary-General is developing from a manager employed within the framework of
one spe cific department into a manager with a far more general task packet employed
by the national administration. In order to further stimulate this development, in
order to reinforce their legal position it would be advisable for this category of
governmental managers to develop a separate regime.
rF
Surnrnary
New strategies will be called for in order to continue managing the public sector
in the future. It has been demonstrated above that the existing instruments of the
government are no longer adequate and require supplementation. The world of
politics is going to haye to provide the solutions.
It has also been demonstrated above that governmentd, organizations as such will
be needing new forms of organization and management. The functionary bearing
the prime responsibiliry in this connection is indeed the Secretary-General, but a
'new-style' Secretary-General who, with deference to the individual political respon-
sibility of the Minister for the course of affairs in his or her department, is the central
point of address and consequently seryes as an indispensable link between the wodd
of politics and the official apparatus. The Secretary-General will no longer be able
to play this role as an isolated superintendent of financial, legal and personnel affairs
or a glorified advisor to the Minister, but will have to be an integral manager and
team chairman, an inspiring figure with integrity and with autho riry that is not
solely based upon Royal Decrees, but has mainly been acquired in the course ofyears
of experience within the government system, if possible in a variety of positions.
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